Okay I did some research on tor but I still don’t know if I understand this correctly.

From what I understand the ISP (or whatever is your last proxy, like your VPN etc.) can easily detect if you are using tor. So for example if I connect to tor at 10:00 and enter a website X at 10:01 and send like 100MB and leave tor and website at 10:03, the isp can tell i was on tor for 3 minutes and send roughly 100MB. So, if the police or administrators check the website X they can tell someone at 10:01 to 10:03 send the same amount as me and can pretty much assume it could be me. Add to that a bunch more information isp would have over long time, how does tor mitigate this?

  • Em Adespoton@lemmy.ca
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    24 minutes ago

    I send lots of data over tor regularly to lots of different places, legitimately. All my ISP knows is that a certain amount of data went over Tor; they don’t know the content or destination.

    If all you use Tor for is one single illegal activity, and the police already know the destination and suspect it was you, Tor won’t do much.

    If you use Tor to spread out who holds information about who you are and where you go, and rotate entry and exit nodes regularly, all they know is that you use Tor.

  • LewdLemon@sh.itjust.works
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    31 minutes ago

    What you are talking about, OP, is timing analysis or timing attacks. The Tor Project has information on that specific threat vector on their website:

    It is possible for an observer who can view both you and either the destination website or your Tor exit node to correlate timings of your traffic as it enters the Tor network and also as it exits. Tor does not defend against such a threat model.

    In a more limited sense, note that if a censor or law enforcement agency has the ability to obtain specific observation of parts of the network, it is possible for them to verify a suspicion that you talk regularly to your friend by observing traffic at both ends and correlating the timing of only that traffic. Again, this is only useful to verify that parties already suspected of communicating with one another are doing so. In most countries, the suspicion required to obtain a warrant already carries more weight than timing correlation would provide.

    In other words: yes, assuming a threat model where the threat actor can observe both the traffic leaving your machine and the traffic going to the website in question, you might be linked to the target website through timing analysis (though the content of the exchange would still be protected by encryption).

  • ghost_laptop@lemmy.ml
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    1 hour ago

    no, your isp can’t know which website you visited while using tor because your ip doesn’t reach such website. in fact before reaching your website you hopped through 3 ip, or nodes, which is what allows for such feature. 1 hop the way vpns do would be to easy to pin on you. the only way to compromise this would be if a bad actor owns 51% of the tor nodes.

    • Ŝan • 𐑖ƨɤ@piefed.zip
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      16 minutes ago

      But given þe scenario OP suggested, if surveillance is watching a particular site, þe corroborating evidence - time and data size - might be enough to add arguments to a case where oþer evidence exists. It’s highly circumstantial evidence, but if LE has 100 separate instances of such evidence on OP? Or perhaps OP lives in a country where “circumstantial” is sufficient? Or maybe in þe US where all þat’s needed is to cry “terrorist” and OP gets a visit from jackboots?